UNHCR

REFUGEE

ABSTRACTS

CDR

Centre for Documentation on Refugees

Centre de Documentation sur les Refugies

Centro de Documentacion sobre los Refugiados
 

Volume 8, Number 4                                                        December, 1989



 

Foreword

UNHCR AND THE NEED FOR "EARLY WARNING"¹

Luise Druke²

When human life is at stake a situation which is not uncommon in the context of mass refugee flows there is a moral obligation to be well prepared. This includes perhaps with the highest priority the obligation to have crucial information as early as possible from reliable sources. UNHCR needs to strengthen its early warning capacity, within the structure of its own organization as welt as in cooperation with others. A number of international and non-governmental organizations as well as governments have been taking initiatives in early warning activities. Most of them are however directed towards preventive measures, which will not be discussed here. This article will focus on early warning to improve emergency preparedness and response.

Consequences from lack of systematic early warning

During the last decade UNHCR has been compelled to respond to more massive refugee influxes than ever before. Both UNHCR and other agencies in the field have generally been able to improve their response to these massive emergencies such as in Central America (Honduras 1986). the Horn of Africa (Sudan/Ethiopia 1987-88). and Southern Africa (Malawi 1988-89).

There have been other examples from which a number of lessons can still be learned. In 1978-79 UNHCR was clearly overwhelmed by and unprepared for the mass influx in South East Asia. The number of boat people washed onto the beaches there seriously challenged UNHCR's capability to cope. One of the problems was the lack of advance information. The result was much human suffering, including deaths. It took a while until emergency assistance by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations reached the sites.

Another example is documented in the Eastern Sudan Case Study, which has been used in the Emergency Management Training Programme since 1985 and which is based on an internal evaluation report. Even though there had been reports, already in 1984, of a potential major influx from Ethiopia. UNHCR and other agencies were unprepared when the refugees began arriving. In the few months that the staff in Sudan had between warning and the beginning of the influx, little or nothing was done to prepare for such an emergency. Therefore, the speed with which UNHCR was able to respond to the refugee influx was greatly handicapped by the lack of emergency preparation throughout the organization. Once the emergency began, the absence of prior planning. identification of staff, new operational partners, materials, and food sources often meant that the operation was continually struggling to catch up wild events rather than begin in a position to anticipate them.

Whereas in the first case both early warning and consequent action were lacking, in the second case the lack of acting on the early warning signals was rather the problem. It must obviously be our common goal to prevent a recurrence and seriously consider which lessons could be learned from the past.

The problems: lack of a system:

While everyone seems in agreement that contingency planning and emergency preparedness are good things, the necessity to have at one's disposal systematic and objective information at an early stage for this purpose seems sometimes less well understood.
UNHCR officials in their daily work, have access to much valuable information, often in a well-organized and systematic manner. But in the absence of any system and specific instructions from Headquarters. UNHCR field officers cannot be expected to take the time to systematically gather early warning information from the first refugees arriving in a country of refuge. Human rights violations, which is one of the major causes of refugee flows, and other problems are often known in emergency-prone countries v/here UNHCR may be present. It is not a lack of quantity or quality of information that results in the loss or underutilization of such valuable information. Rather it is a lack of systematic arrangement which currently hinders effective use of information. If it reaches UNHCR policy-makers at all, it tends to reach them in a fragmented or watered-down manner. Or it may get stuck in the channels and not reach them in time for action.

A practical approach to early warning in UNHCR:

To make the necessary adjustments, there is a need both for training and for creating the conditions to make this an integral part of UNHCR's ongoing work. In an initial phase, draft guidelines questionnaires for refugee sources and checklists for non-refugee sources will be discussed by an in-house working-group on early warning and tested in selected field situations. As a second step, a component on how to use early warning information for analysis leading to effective management decisions and implementation of action could be made part of normal procedures e.g. by including it in the job descriptions of UNHCR officials and the UNHCR Manual. In a third phase. UNHCR may request the support of the Executive Committee for its early warning activities world-wide. Although all phases have to be executed in a logical order preliminary discussions on all phases could start immediately. All stages together should bring about a situation in which UNHCR policy makers have access to reliable and accurate information gathered in a systematic fashion analyzed and presented timely for policy options.

"Cost" and "benefit" of systematic early warning:

Enhancing UNHCR's early warning capacity will have to start by establishing more effective information gathering and analysing. The cost for establishing an early warning information system especially in view of UNHCR's current financial crisis can be kept to a minimum. Existing staff, in particular in emergency-prone countries could be asked initially on a test basis, to carry out early warning work as a part of contingency/operations planning.
Against this idea is often put forward that UNHCR does not normally have at its disposal confidential channels for the transmission of sensitive information. Therefore some may have a legitimate fear that early warning information could potentially backfire against those whom we hope to belter protect. In addition, there is a lack of regional coordination where there are no regional offices. Furthermore field staff especially in emergency-prone countries, tend to be already overworked. Others might feel that asking questions and preparing an emergency response could create a "pull factor".
On the other hand it has been argued that processing early warning information for policy recommendations by UNHCR field representatives might help to depoliticize problems that could arise exactly because of the lack of confidential communication channels. Advance knowledge would enhance UNHCR's protection function for new arrivals and allow UNHCR to "pull" resources from other UN agencies and NGO sources to fill the gaps for specific assistance measures
In the past a number of UNHCR staff have already made important contributions in obtaining and forwarding early warning information on situations they were dealing with. Once this practice has become more sys1-tematized and integrated into the normal operations of the organization. many who previously were reluctant to engage themselves in such activities may be encouraged.

Protection, human rights and early warning:

In recognition of the link between refugee law and human rights. UNHCR has been following human rights developments with increasing attention and timely contributions, as for example in the UN Commission for Human Rights This is an important advance in promoting a more comprehensive approach to seeking solutions for the problem of refugees The establishment of an early warning system would seem a further step in the right direction. Many delegations at the 1989 EXCOM meeting acknowledged that discussions on protection and solutions could not take place in a vacuum and that issues such as "human rights developments and early warning arrangements were of direct relevance"³. It is to be admitted that many aspects of this new approach still need considerable rethinking, but most of the controversy concerns UNHCR's mandate to intervene actively in the preventive process and would not seem to affect its need to know. understand and be prepared.

"Models" and Cooperation
 

Following crises in the late 1970s, a number of organizations have set up function-specific early warning mechanisms According to the study being currently

conducted by the UN Joint Inspection Unit on early warning activities in the United Nations system, these efforts tend to follow the decentralization and fragmentation as it exists in the UN work which results in a lack of adequate coordination The FAO. for example, established the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS). which keeps the FAO informed about the food supply situation and requirements for exceptional assistance arising from crop failure or unusual crop surplus Other agencies involved with refugee flows such as UNDRO, UNDP. UNICEF. WHO, WMO. and WFP have been taking steps in the same direction UNHCR may be inspired by but cannot rely on these other early warning systems, and needs to organize its own It has started in making some progress in the area of information management such as setting up an "institutional memory", inter alia. by the expansion of the Refugee Literature (REFLIT) database of the Centre for Documentation on Refugees In addition the project to organize an international refugee documentation network may become of great importance in laying the groundwork for future exchange of information and division of labour In close consultation with other networks such as the Human Rights Information and Documentation System (HURIDOCS) and the Info-doc working group of ECRE (European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles), priority is going to the creation of and the training in the basic tools for information handling, such as standard formats and agreed terminology ⁴ What is needed in addition is a policy and infrastructure for the systematic gathering of information which could be helpful in assessing the likelihood of future flows of refugees, and meeting emergency needs.

Conclusion:

Considering the serious consequences that have resulted from the lack of early warning in past refugee emergencies, and taking into account that the benefit of establishing such a system within UNHCR far outweighs the costs, does it not seem time to set up a system for early warning and analysis, as a vehicle for developing better informed options and actions ? It would bring UNHCR into a leadership position where it belongs in acting early and effectively in refugee emergencies, end prepare it for the kind of solution-oriented activities that the world is increasingly expecting from it.

 

¹ Pending the adoption of a more appropriate term by and within UNHCR. eariy warning is used here to mean early systematic information gathering and analysis lor effective contingency planning.
² MPA. Harvard University. Dr. phil. thesis Preventive Action tor Refugee Producing Situations. published by Peter Lanq. Berne. Luise Druke is currently assigned in the Emergency Unit of the Technical Support Service at UNHCR Headquarters.
³ UN Doc A/AC 96/734. 6 October 1989 Report of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection, p. 4
⁴ See P Rudge and M Kjaerum / The Information aspects of refugee work time for a Full-scale information strategy Refugee Abstracts Vol. 7/4) December 1988